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Case No. 20070941-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Williams J. Hopkins, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions on three counts of enticing a minor over 
the internet, a second degree felony, and seven counts of attempted dealing in 
material harmful to a minor, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting excerpts from the videos 
defendant sent over the Internet to an undercover officer posing as a thirteen-year-
old girl, where the videos were highly probative of elements necessary to prove 
defendant's guilt? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Hodge, 2008 UT 
App 409, f 13,196 R3d 124. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES 
The following statutes, defining defendant's crimes, are attached at 
Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401 (West Supp. 2007); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (West Supp. 2007). 
Rule 403, of the Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with three counts of 
enticement of a minor over the Internet, a second degree felony, and eight counts of 
2 
attempted dealing in material harmful to a minor, a class A misdemeanor (R. 113-
111).* Defendant waived his preliminary hearing (R. 29-27). 
At his jury trial, defendant moved to exclude sexually graphic videos he had 
sent to a police officer posing as a minor over the Internet, claiming that the 
probative value of the videos was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice (R. 160:92). The trial court denied defendant's motion but ordered that 
only brief portions of each video could be shown (R. 160:96, 99-100). 
At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved to dismiss all of the 
charges save one enticement of a minor over the Internet count (R. 160:124-28). The 
trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 160:128-29). The jury convicted defendant 
on all counts (R. 143-41). Defendant was sentenced to serve consecutive l-to-15 year 
1
 Defendant was originally charged with dealing in material harmful to a 
minor, not attempted dealing in material harmful to a minor (R. 3-1,33-30). Before 
trial, the trial court ruled that defendant could not be convicted of dealing in 
material harmful to a minor because the recipient of the material in this case was 
actually a police officer, not a minor (R. 110-104). The trial court ruled, however, 
that defendant could be convicted of attempted dealing in material harmful to a 
minor because " [a] defense to the offense of attempt does not arise. . . due to factual 
or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the attendant 
circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-
101 (3) (b). Thus, the State amended the distribution charges to attempted 
distribution (R. 113-111). On appeal, the State takes no position on the correctness of 
the trial court's ruling. 
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prison terms on each felony conviction and to serve concurrent one-year jail terms 
on each of the misdemeanor convictions (R. 158-53). 
Defendant timely appealed.2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 15, 2007 and April 12, 2007, Detective Lance Smith, of the Payson 
Police Department and the Utah County Sex Crimes Task Force, was on the Internet 
"in the Yahoo chat room under the romance section of the chat room" (R. 160:53). 
On both days, Detective Smith used the name "Tiffaniegurl05" ('Tiffany'7) (R. 
160:55; St. Exh. 1-3). 
Over the course of those two days, Detective Smith had three Internet chats 
with defendant (R. 160:59,70, 78; St. Exh. 1-3). The first chat on March 15 began at 
about 8:13 p.m. and lasted about 45 minutes (R. 160:57). Defendant used the name 
"Regulator20022002" (R. 160:55; St. Exh. 1-2). 
Almost immediately, defendant asked Tiffany whether she "want[ed] to have 
sex with [him]?" and whether she would "let [him] eat your pussy?" (R. 160:61). 
Defendant then asked Tiffany how old she was (Id.). Tiffany responded that she 
2
 Although no notice of appeal appears in the trial court's record, this Court's 
docket records a notice of appeal as having been timely filed. 
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was "[tjhirteen" and asked defendantif that was "ok" (Id.) Defendant responded, "if 
you like big dicks" (Id.). He then asked Tiffany "[w]ould you give me head?" (Id.). 
Defendant asked Tiffany if he could call her (R. 160:62; St. Exh. 1). When 
Tiffany responded that she did not want defendant to know where she lived, 
defendant responded, "how we going to have sex" (Id.). Defendant explained, "I 
want to f~k you in all the places you want me to f—k you" and "I want you to tie me 
up and tease my cock for a while" (R. 160:62-63; St. Exh. 1). When Tiffany again said 
she was afraid defendant would be able to find her home if she gave her telephone 
number, defendant gave Tiffany his number (R. 160:65-66; St. Exh. 1). He later told 
Tiffany, "I will kiss you and suck your tits and finger your pussy" (R. 160:66-67; St. 
Exh. 1). 
Almost immediately upon starting his conversation with Tiffany, defendant 
began sending her sexually graphic videos over the Internet (R. 160:61; St. Exh. 1,4). 
During their 45-minute conversation, defendant sent Tiffany five such videos (R. 
160:69). The first shows a woman exposing her breasts and fondling herself in front 
of a camera; the second shows a younger woman, breasts exposed, alternately 
stroking a man's erect penis and performing oral sex on him; the third shows a man 
and naked woman having vaginal sex; the fourth shows a very young and 
undeveloped woman, with glasses and braces, disrobing and then being directed as 
5 
she performed oral sex on a male; the fifth shows a young woman, breasts exposed, 
stroking a man's penis and performing oral sex on him (St. Exh. 4). 
As defendant sent one of the videos, he told Tiffany, "I want you to look like 
this chick" (R. 160:63; St. Exh. 1). Tiffany then asked defendant, "you mean you 
want me to look like the girl with the glasses," i.e., the undeveloped girl in the 
fourth video (R. 160:65; St. Exh. 1). Defendant responded, "she's hot" (Id.). 
After talking a bit more, defendant told Tiffany "I gotta go for a while" to 
" Walmart," but that he would "be right back" (R. 160:67; St. Exh. 1). 
About an hour later, Detective Smith, again using the name Tiffany, sent a 
message to defendant asking if he was there (R. 160:70; St. Exh. 2). Defendant 
responded that Tiffany was supposed to call him (R. 160:70-71; St. Exh. 2). He then 
told Tiffany he wanted her "to hold on to my cock," and again asked Tiffany if she 
was going to call him (R. 160:71; St. Exh. 2). A female officer pretending to be Tiff ay 
then called defendant (R. 160:72). After the call, defendant asked Tiffany if she was 
"a cop" because "[y]ou sound older" (R. 160:71; St. Exh. 2). Tiffany responded that 
she had a cold (R. 160:71-72; St. Exh. 2). After defendant asked Tiffany to send him a 
picture, Tiffany asked defendant what he wanted her to do first (R. 160:75; St. Exh. 
2). Defendant said "I want you to straddle my face and grind your pussy into my 
tongue" (Id.). Defendant then again asked for a picture, "so I know what I'm getting 
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myself into before I meet you" (Id.). Defendant explained, "I just don't want no 
surprises"; "I want to know that you are real [] not some fake" (R. 160::76; St. Exh. 
2). When Tiffany did not oblige him, defendant responded, "this is where it ends 
then, sorry" (Id.). When Tiffany asked why, defendant asked her " [w]hatyear were 
you born? You have ten seconds to answer or I'm out" (R. 160:77; St. Exh. 2). When 
Tiffany said "1985," defendant responded, "Wrong answer. Time up or yeah, I'm 
up" (R. 160:77). When Tiffany objected, defendant said, "You're a cop" (Id.). 
Shortly thereafter, defendant stopped talking (Id.). 
On April 12, 2007, defendant was again in a chat room, but was this time 
using the name "Dragonlance84015" (R. 160:78). Based on that name's profile, 
Detective Smith recognized him as defendant, so Smith "jumped on line and 
contacted him again" (R. 160:78). 
As they started chatting, defendant immediately asked Tiffany her age (R. 
160:81; St. Exh. 3). Tiffany responded that she was "13" (Id.). Defendant then 
"started talking sexual and sending videos" again (R. 160:79-80; St. Exh. 3). 
Defendant told Tiffany, "I want to f—k, I'm horny," and then asked if he could call 
her (R. 160:81; St. Exh. 3). After Tiffany again said "no," she asked defendant, "you 
do not care if I am 13? Is that hot?" (R. 160:82; St. Exh. 3). Defendant responded, 
"Yes. Hot. Hot. Hot" (Id.). Defendant then said, "I'd like you and one other girl" 
7 
and asked "you got a girlfriend?" (R. 160:83; St. Exh. 3). When Tiffany responded 
that she had a 14-year-old girlfriend, defendant said, "I want to f—k you both" (Id.). 
Tiffany then asked when (Id.). Defendant said "soon" and "weekend" (Id.). When 
defendant asked "where," Tiffany said "Provo" because she did not drive (R. 83-84; 
St. Exh. 3). Defendant responded, "You're 13. I know you do not have a car" (R. 
160:84; St. Exh. 3). Defendant then asked, "Can I come in you?" (Id.). Shortly 
thereafter, the conversation ended (R. 160:85; St. Exh. 3). 
During their April 12th conversation, defendant sent Tiffany four more video 
clips (R. 160:85; St. Exh. 5). The first shows a woman, with breasts exposed, stroking 
a man's penis; the second shows a clothed woman performing oral sex on a man; the 
third shows two women performing sexual acts on each other; and the fourth shows 
a naked woman and man having vaginal and anal sex (St. Exh. 5). 
Later that night, Detective Smith called defendant on the telephone and told 
him "we needed to talk about the videos that he sent and the chats that he was 
having with a girl named Tiffany" (R. 160:86-88). Detective Smith did not identify 
himself as Tiffany at that time (R. 160:87). Defendant said he "knew that she was 13, 
but it was fantasy" (R. 160:120). Still, defendant "apologized" and acknowledged 
"that he probably shouldn't have sent the videos," but said "that we would sit down 
and talk about it" (R. 160:88). 
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After the call, Detective Smith sent a private email from Tiffany to defendant, 
"apologizing that he got in trouble from the police" to "see what his response to that 
would be" (R. 160:87). The next day, defendant contacted Detective Smith "and told 
me that he got a message from Tiffany and that he wanted me to talk to her mom 
and tell her to stop sending the messages, because he didn't want to get in any more 
trouble" (R. 160:88). 
Defendant met with Detective Smith on May 18 (R. 160:88). During their 
meeting, Detective Smith asked defendant "why he wasn't talking to 18-year-old 
girls and older" (R. 160:89). Defendant responded "he likes young girls that age" (R. 
160:89,155). 
The videos. Toward the end of Detective Smith's direct testimony, the State 
asked that the two dvds containing the videos defendant sent to Tiffany be marked 
as exhibits (R. 160:89). Defense counsel requested a sidebar, after which the trial 
court excused the jury (R. 160:89-90). 
Defense counsel then objected to admission of the dvds under rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (R. 160:92). Counsel argued that the video evidence was "highly 
prejudicial and will incite the jury and I don't think they need to see it" where 
Detective Smith could "give a detailed description of what each depicts" (R. 160:92). 
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The State countered that, while the videos "might get [the jury] riled up," he 
did not "think it's going to excite their passions to the point tha t . . . they'll lose their 
reasons and just go on a witch hunt against [defendant]" (Id.). Moreover, the 
evidence was "highly relevant" because "this is part of the enticement" where 
defendant "was using these videos, he referred to them, he referred back to them, 
says he wants Detective Smith to look like the young girl" (Id.). And, the prosecutor 
argued, the evidence was relevant to prove the "dealing in harmful material to a 
minor" charges (R. 160:93). 
Defense counsel then suggested that "if we stipulate to [the harmful nature of 
the material], there's no need for them to present" the "highly prejudicial" videos 
(R. 160:95). The prosecutor countered that, "to stipulate to these things, it takes the 
air out of a case a little bit, because these videos do drive the point home of exactly 
what [defendant] was thinking, where his mind was" (Id.). 
The trial court ruled that "[t]he jury will be told that for the purpose of the 
evidence in the case, the defendant stipulates that the videos sent by him to Tiffany 
. . . were harmful materials for a minor" (R. 160:96). Notwithstanding, the court 
would "allow the showing of each of those videos for a very short period of time so 
the jury can see what the type of communication is" (Id.). However, the jury would 
not see any of the nine videos in full (Id.). The court then explained: "I believe that 
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the videos are proper to be seen by reason of the information distributed during the 
time of the chats in question and the control will be made as to the amount of time 
that the videos will be shown" (R. 160:99-100). 
During a subsequent sidebar, the parties apparently agreed not to show one 
of the videos because it had "quite a lead" before the sexual conduct began (R. 
160:105,108). The remaining videos were then presented through a laptop computer 
situated for the jurors' viewing (R. 160:102,106). 
Defendant's defense. Defendant asserted that he was not guilty of any of the 
charges because he did not believe Tiffany was actually a minor when he talked 
with her (R. 160:132,176). In support of that defense, defendant relied solely on his 
own testimony. 
Defendant testified that he is a 34-year-old who, when on the Internet, 
generally "chat[s] in the adult role play chat room" (R. 160:135). According to 
defendant, in an adult role play chat room, "you act out different sexual —sexual 
fantasies, sexual activities" (R. 160:136). "[S]ome people like playing different-
younger — younger people. I mean, there —there's different situations; doctors/ 
patients, you know; older man/younger woman; some of the more forbidden 
fantasies, the father/daughter, brother/sister" (R. 160:136-37). "As —for me, it 
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would have been [a] younger woman with an older guy, or [] a daughter/father-
type thing" (R. 160:137). 
Defendant testified that he probably contacted Tiffany on March 15 because 
she was on his "friends list," indicating that he had "likely" talked with her before 
(R. 160:136). Defendant claimed he would try to contact someone on his friends list 
"[b]ecause usually those that are on my friends list, I've had adult role plays before" 
(Id.). However, he never actually wanted to meet the people with whom he chatted: 
"My whole thing was, I did it through cyberspace so that I didn't have to meet up 
with people" (R. 160:137). But, defendant testified, he did like them to call him, 
because "I like hearing voices . . . to make it as real as possible without actually 
being — being real" (Id.). Thus, according to defendant, when he told Tiffany at one 
point that he wanted to see her, he actually only meant that he "want[ed] to see a 
picture" (R. 160:138). 
Defendant recalled asking Tiffany to call him and then getting a phone call (R. 
160:142). However, the woman "sounded like an older — older woman," and "most 
of the time when I . . . do role playing"and "I'm talking to someone . . . we carry the 
role play into . . . the telephone conversation" (Id.). "[Tjhat's why" he said to 
Tiffany online "/[w]ell, you sound older'" (Id.). 
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According to defendant, he did at one point think "it might be a cop trying to 
entrap me" (Id.). But he continued on with the conversation because he "really 
wasn't sure it was a cop at the time" (R. 160:143). Still, defendant testified, he asked 
Tiffany when she was born "'cause usually if—if it's a cop trying to entrap 
somebody,. . . they're going to get the wrong number, wrong age" (Id.). And, when 
Tiffany gave the wrong date, "I quit talking,. . . I basically just said, okay, well, I'm 
done" (Id.). Then, when Tiffany "started to get really vague," defendant "just 
. . . quit talking with her" (Id.). 
According to defendant, he was also in an adult role play chat room on April 
12, when he talked with Tiffany again (R. 160:144). At that point, he continued to 
talk with her because "I was in it just for the role play" and "as long as they were an 
adul t , . . . I really didn't care who I was role playing with" (R. 160:145). He claimed 
that when he sent the videos to Tiffany, he did not know she was a minor (R. 
160:146). 
Thus, according to defendant, when he got the call from Detective Smith on 
April 12 telling him that Tiffany was a child, "it upset me" (R. 160:151). And, when 
he got the email from Tiffany shortly thereafter, he called Detective Smith and asked 
him to contact Tiffany's mother "just in case it was a child, I did not want any — any 
contact with that" (Id.). 
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Finally, defendant testified that, when Detective Smith asked him why he did 
not go for 18 or 19-year-olds, defendant told him "it wasn't the age that did it for me 
It wasn't the age — the whole age, I could have gone for — it could have been 21. 
It was just the younger — being younger than I was" (R. 160:153). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion under rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, when it admitted excerpts of the videos defendant sent 
Tiffany during their Internet chats. According to defendant, admission of the videos 
was not necessary because defendant stipulated that they were "harmful to a 
minor" and Detective Smith could have testified as to their content. Thus, 
defendant argues, their admission was unduly prejudicial. 
In asserting his claim, defendant fails to overcome case law holding that 
damaging evidence is not rendered inadmissible under rule 403 simply because a 
defendant is willing to stipulate to the facts depicted therein, or the information 
contained therein could have been established by other means. He also fails to 
overcome case law specifically affirming a trial court's admission of pornographic 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING EXCERPTS FROM VIDEOS DEFENDANT SENT 
OVER THE INTERNET TO AN UNDERCOVER OFFICER 
POSING AS A THIRTEEN-YEAR-OLD GIRL, WHERE THE 
VIDEOS WERE HIGHLY PROBATIVE OF ELEMENTS 
NECESSARY TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
Defendant claims the trial court erred under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
in admitting excerpts of the videos he sent to Tiffany during their Internet chats, 
where he was willing to stipulate to their harmfulness and Detective Smith could 
have testified as to their contents. See Aplt. Br. at 9-13. In asserting his claim, 
defendant recognizes that this Court has previously affirmed the admission of 
pornographic videos despite a stipulation by the defendant as to their content. See 
Aplt. Br. at 11-12 (discussing State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990)). 
Defendant claims, however, that his case "is distinguishable/7 because Detective 
Smith's "ability to testify as to the specific content of the videos would have been a 
viable alternative proof of the nature of the videos." Id. Thus, defendant argues, 
"[t]he only purpose in playing the videos . . . was to unfairly prejudice [him]" with 
the jury. Id. at 12. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Rule 403 provides that," [although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
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confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence/7 Under this rule, 
courts "presume that the proffered evidence is admissible unless '[it] has an unusual 
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury/" State v. Jaeger, 1999 
UT 1, f 18, 973 P.2d 404 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 R2d 1201,1221 (Utah 1993)). 
"'The probative value of evidence is judged by the strength of the evidence 
and its ability to make the existence of a consequential fact either more or less 
probable and the proponent's need for the evidence/" State v. Downs, 2008 UT App 
247, If 8, 190 P.3d 17 (quoting State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah 1989)). 
However, "a stipulation of fact by defense counsel . . . is [not] a basis for depriving 
the prosecution the opportunity from profiting from the legitimate moral force of its 
evidence in persuading a jury." State v. Gubransen, 2005 UT 7, f^ 37,106 P.3d 734 
(discussing admissibility of photographic evidence) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Nor does evidence become inadmissible under rule 403 merely 
because "the information depicted in [it could have been] or was established by 
other means." Id. at ^ 38 (citations omitted); see also State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, ^ 31, 
61 P.3d 1019 (upholding admission of video of crime even though video was 
"disturbing and difficult to watch," where "high probative value of the videotape 
far outweigh[ed] any potential prejudice toward the defendant"); State v. Decorso, 
16 
1999 UT 57, | 54, 993 R3d 837 ("[P]hotographs of the victim are not excluded by 
rule 403 simply because the State could have established the same facts through 
other evidence/'). Rather, "'[s]o long as the defendant maintain[s] his [not] guilty 
plea, the State [has] the right to prove its case up to the hilt in whatever manner it 
[chooses], subject only to the rules of evidence and standards of fair play/" 
Gubransen, 2005 UT 7, ]f 37 (quoting, in parenthetical, State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 
455 (Utah 1989)) (all but fourth set of brackets in original). 
In State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990), this Court applied these 
principles to uphold the admission of pornographic videos despite Moore's 
willingness to stipulate to their content. Moore was charged with sexual 
exploitation of a minor, dealing in harmful material to a minor, and distributing 
pornographic material. Moore, 788 P.2d at 526. Before trial, Moore objected to the 
admission of two homemade pornographic videotapes where he was willing to 
stipulate that the videotapes "(1) were pornographic; (2) contained material of a live 
performance depicting a nude or partially nude female; (3) were for the purpose of 
sexual arousal; and (4) contained material which would be harmful to a minor/ ' Id. 
at 527. The trial court, however, admitted the videos because "they were relevant to 
the case and not unfairly prejudicial to defendant." Id. 
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On appeal, Moore claimed that "playing the videotapes was unnecessary and 
prejudicial because/7 given his stipulation, "the only issues to be decided by the jury 
were whether defendant knew or had reason to know that one of the actors was 
under eighteen years of age and whether defendant's actions met the statutory test 
for distribution of pornographic material/' Id. 
In rejecting Moore's claim, this Court acknowledged that the videos 
"showjed] graphic pornography" and, therefore, "are in some sense prejudicial." Id. 
However, where "the trial judge considered the impact of defendant's proffered 
stipulation and weighed the danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value 
of the evidence," this Court could not conclude that "the trial judge's admission of 
that evidence was error." Id. 
Moore defeats defendant's claim. Defendant was charged with enticing a 
minor over the Internet and attempted dealing in material harmful to a minor. To 
convict defendant of enticing a minor over the Internet, the State had to prove that 
defendant "knowingly use[d] a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or 
at tempted] to use a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a person 
the defendant believes to be a minor to engage in any sexual activity which is a 
violation of state criminal law." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1)(a) (West Supp. 
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2007).3 To convict defendant of attempted dealing in material harmful to a minor, 
the State had to prove that, "knowing that a person is a minor, or having negligently 
failed to determine the proper age of a minor," defendant intentionally took a 
substantial step to "distribute[]. . . to a minor any material harmful to minors." Id. 
§§ 76-10-1206(l)(a) (West Supp. 2007)4, 76-4-101 (West 2004). "Material harmful to 
minors" includes "that quality of any . . . representation, in whatsoever form, of 
nudity, sexual conduct[ or] sexual excitement. . . when i t . . . (i) taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest in sex with minors"; "(ii) is patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is 
suitable material for minors"; and "(iii) taken as a whole, does not have serious 
value for minors." Id. § 76-10-1201 (5)(a)(i), (ii) (West Supp. 2007).5 
The videos defendant sent to Tiffany were highly probative of defendant's 
guilt as to both crimes. Most obviously, the videos provided the strongest evidence 
possible on whether defendant intentionally attempted to distribute material that, 
by its "representation . . . of nudity, sexual conduct[ or] sexual excitement . . . 
3
 The 2007 version of this statute is applicable to defendant's April 12, 2007 
charges. The 2004 version of this statute, applicable to defendant's March 15, 2007 
charges, is substantially similar to the 2007 version. 
4
 See fn. 3. 
5
 See fn. 3. 
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appeals to the prurient interest in sex with minors," "is patently offensive . . . with 
respect to what is suitable material for minors," and "taken as a whole, does not 
have serious value for minors." Id. Thus, they were highly relevant to defendant's 
attempted dealing in material harmful to a minor charges. 
In addition, the videos were highly relevant to defendant's enticing a minor 
over the Internet charges. On both March 15 and April 12, defendant sent Tiffany 
videos as they were talking (St. Exh. 1, 3). A significant portion of their 
conversations related to the content of those videos, where both defendant and 
Tiffany referred to them to identify what defendant wanted Tiffany to do to him and 
what he wanted to do to Tiffany. At one point, defendant asked Tiffany if the 
videos made her "horny" (R. 160:64; St. Exh. 1-3). The content of the videos, 
therefore, was an integral part of the communications defendant and Tiffany were 
having (St. Exh. 1,3). Consequently, the content of those videos, which gave context 
to defendant's conversations with Tiffany, was highly probative of whether 
defendant was using the Internet "to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or a t tempt[] . . . 
to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice [Tiffany]... to engage in any sexual activity which 
is a violation of state criminal law." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1)(a). 
Furthermore, defendant's primary defense at trial was that he did not believe 
Tiffany was actually a minor when he conversed with her (R. 160:132, 176). 
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However, during their first conversation on March 15, defendant referred Tiffany to 
one of the videos — the one containing the youngest and least developed woman—as 
what he hoped Tiffany looked like (R. 160:63, 65; St. Exh. 1). The content of that 
specific video, therefore, was uniquely probative of whether defendant in fact 
believed Tiffany was an adult at the time they conversed. 
Given the high probative value of the videos, neither defendant's willingness 
to stipulate to their harmfulness nor Detective Smith's ability to provide cold 
testimony as to their content rendered the videos inadmissible under rule 403. See 
Gulbrasen, 2005 UT 7, I t 37-38; Kell, 2002 UT 106, f 31; Decor so, 1999 UT 57, f 54; 
Moore, 788 P.2d at 527. This is especially so where defendant's stipulation did not 
address the probative value of the videos vis-a-vis either the enticement charges or 
defendant's defense that he did not believe Tiffany was a minor. And substituting 
Detective Smith's testimony for actual videos would have detracted from the State's 
ability to convey to the jury the true essence of defendant's conversations with 
Tiffany by sanitizing an integral part of defendant's enticement scheme. Cf. Kell, 
2002 UT 106, K 31. 
Finally, notwithstanding the high probative value of the video evidence, the 
trial court took steps to minimize any potential for unfair prejudice to defendant 
before admitting them. Thus, the trial court did not allow the jury to see the videos 
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in full; rather, the court limited the jury's viewing of the videos to brief excerpts (R. 
160:96, 99-100). See Moore, 788 P.2d at 527 (rejecting challenge to admission of 
pornographic videos where trial court "weighed the danger of unfair prejudice 
against the probative value of the evidence"). 
Given these circumstances, defendant has not shown that the trial court 
abused its discretion in ruling that the videos were admissible under rule 403. See 
Gubransen, 2005 UT 7, HI 37-38; Kell, 2002 UT 106, % 31; Decor so, 1999 UT 57, % 54; 
Moore, 788 P.2d at 527. Consequently, defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
ruling fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted February *•*>, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK J 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
§ 76-4-101 Attempt-Elements of offense (West 2004) 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if 
he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the 
crime; and 
(b)(i) intends to comniit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an 
awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly 
corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed 
if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be. 
§ 76-4-401 Enticing a minor over the Internet—Elements—Penalties (West 
2004) 
(1) A person commits enticement of a minor over the Internet when the person 
knowingly uses a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or attempts to use a 
computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a person the defendant 
believes to be a minor to engage in any sexual activity which is a violation of state 
criminal law. 
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of enticing a minor under Subsection (1), or an 
attempt to commit this offense, that a law enforcement officer or an undercover 
operative who is working with a law enforcement agency was involved in the 
detection or investigation of the offense. 
(3) An enticement of a minor under Subsection (1) with the intent to commit: 
(a) a first degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(b) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; 
(c) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor; 
(d) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor; and 
(e) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor. 
§ 76-4-401 Enticing a minor over the Internet—Elements—Penalties (West 
Supp. 2007) 
(l)(a) A person commits enticement of a minor over the Internet when the person 
knowingly uses a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or attempts to use a 
computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a person the defendant 
believes to be a minor to engage in any sexual activity which is a violation of state 
criminal law. 
(b) A person commits enticement of a minor over the Internet when the person 
knowingly uses a computer to initiate contact with a minor or a person the 
defendant believes to be a minor and subsequently, by any electronic or written 
means, solicits, seduces, lures, or entices, or attempts to solicit, seduce, lure, or 
entice the minor or a person the defendant believes to be the minor to engage in 
any sexual activity which is a violation of state criminal law. 
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of enticing a minor under Subsection (1), or an 
attempt to commit this offense, that a law enforcement officer or an undercover 
operative who is working with a law enforcement agency was involved in the 
detection or investigation of the offense. 
(3) An enticement of a minor under Subsection (1) with the intent to commit: 
(a) a first degree felony is a: 
(i) second degree felony upon the first conviction for violation of this 
Subsection (3)(a); and 
(ii) first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not fewer than three years and which may be for life, upon a second or any 
subsequent conviction for a violation of this Subsection (3)(a); 
(b) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; 
(c) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor; 
(d) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor; and 
(e) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor. 
(4)(a) When a person who commits a felony violation of this section has been 
previously convicted of an offense under Subsection (4)(b), the court may not in 
any way shorten the prison sentence, and the court may not: 
(i) grant probation; 
(ii) suspend the execution or imposition of the sentence; 
(iii) enter a judgment for a lower category of offense; or 
(iv) order hospitalization, 
(b) The sections referred to in Subsection (4)(a) are: 
(i) Section 76-4-401, enticing a minor over the Internet; 
(ii) Section 76-5-301.1, child kidnapping; 
(iii) Section 76-5-402, rape; 
(iv) Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child; 
(v) Section 76-5-402.2, object rape; 
(vi) Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child; 
(vii) Subsection 76-5-403(2), forcible sodomy; 
(viii) Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child; 
(ix) Section 76-5-404, forcible sexual abuse; 
(x) Section 76-5-404.1, sexual abuse of a child and aggravated sexual abuse of 
a child; 
(xi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(xii) any offense in any other state or federal jurisdiction which constitutes or 
would constitute a crime in Subsections (4)(b)(i) through (xi); or 
(xiii) the attempt to commit any of the offenses in Subsections (4)(b)(i) through 
(xii). 
§ 76-10-1206 Dealing in material harmful to a minor (West 2004) 
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing that 
a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the 
proper age of a minor, he: 
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit to 
a minor any material harmful to minors; 
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a minor, 
that is harmful to minors; or 
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is harmful 
to minors. 
(2) Each separate offense under this section is a third degree felony punishable by 
a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $300 plus $10 for each article 
exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law and by incarceration, without 
suspension of sentence in any way, for a term of not less than 14 days. This 
section supersedes Section 77-18-1. 
(3) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this section, each 
separate further offense is a second degree felony punishable by a minimum 
mandatory fine of not less than $5,000 plus $10 for each article exhibited up to the 
maximum allowed by law and by incarceration, without suspension of sentence in 
any way, for a term of not less than one year. This section supersedes Section 77-
18-1. 
§ 76-10-1206 Dealing in material harmful to a minor—Exemptions for 
Internet service providers and hosting companies (West Supp. 2007) 
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing that 
a person is a minor, or having negligently failed to detemiine the proper age of a 
minor, the person: 
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit to 
a minor any material harmful to minors; 
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a minor, 
that is harmful to minors; or 
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is harmful 
to minors. 
(2)(a) Each separate offense under this section is a third degree felony punishable 
by: 
(i) a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $1,000 plus $10 for each article 
exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law; and 
(ii) incarceration, without suspension of sentence, for a term of not less than 14 
days, 
(b) This section supersedes Section 77-18-1. 
(3)(a) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this section, each 
separate further offense is a second degree felony punishable by: 
(i) a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $5,000 plus $10 for each article 
exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law; and 
(ii) incarceration, without suspension of sentence, for a term of not less than 
one year, 
(b) This section supersedes Section 77-18-1. 
(c)(i) This section does not apply to an Internet service provider, as defined in 
Section 76-10-1230, if: 
(A) the distribution of pornographic material by the Internet service provider 
occurs only incidentally through the Internet service provider's function of: 
(I) transmitting or routing data from one person to another person; or 
(II) providing a connection between one person and another person; 
(B) the Internet service provider does not intentionally aid or abet in the 
distribution of the pornographic material; and 
(C) the Internet service provider does not knowingly receive funds from or 
through a person who distributes the pornographic material in exchange for 
perniitting the person to distribute the pornographic material. 
(ii) This section does not apply to a hosting company, as defined in Section 76-
10-1230, if: 
(A) the distribution of pornographic material by the hosting company occurs 
only incidentally through the hosting company's function of providing data 
storage space or data caching to a person; 
(B) the hosting company does not intentionally engage, aid, or abet in the 
distribution of the pornographic material; and 
(C) the hosting company does not knowingly receive funds from or through a 
person who distributes the pornographic material in exchange for permitting 
the person to distribute, store, or cache the pornographic material. 
(4)(a) A service provider, as defined in Section 76-10-1230, is not negligent under 
this section if it complies with Section 76-10-1231. 
(b) A content provider, as defined in Section 76-10-1230, is not negligent under 
this section if it complies with Section 76-10-1233. 
